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1. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of relatively free-market economic policies in the
developing nations of the world has created immense opportunities for
Western investors. However, along with these opportunities comes
substantial risk. In addition to ordinary business risk, which is faced by
every businessman or investor whether investing at home or abroad,
investors in developing countries face political risk that is much greater
than that experienced when investing in liberal Western democracies.
Political risk is the risk that the laws of a country will unexpectedly
change to the investor's detriment after the investor has invested capital in
the country, thereby reducing the value of the individual's investment. Put
simply, political risk is the risk of government intervention.' Examples
of political risk are the risks that a government will raise import or export
duties, increase taxes, impose further regulations, or nationalize or
expropriate the assets of the investor.
Political risk may be a minor concern to a business person investing
in a stable liberal democracy with an independent judiciary and a track
record of protecting property rights; however, a foreign investor investing
in an unstable regime or a regime hostile to property rights has no such
assurances and thus faces greater political risk. For example, a Belgian
national investing in oil and gas properties in the United States can be
reasonably confident that, in the unlikely event that the government were
to nationalize his property, it would have to account for this action before
a neutral U.S. court that would not allow such an action to be taken
arbitrarily and would award just compensation.2 The investor's options in
the face of such intervention may be very limited, especially if the country
1. One type of political risk that is not often recognized as such is the very ability of
legislatures to enact legislation, to change the rules from day to day. As pointed out by
the late Italian legal theorist Bruno Leoni in his Freedom and the Law, even if a given
statute is written clearly, "we are never certain that tomorrow we shall still have the rules
we have today." BRUNO LEONI, FREEDOM AND THE LAW 75 (3d ed. 1991) (emphasis in
original). For a detailed discussion of these issues, see Peter H. Aranson, Bruno Leoni
in Retrospect, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 661 (1988); Leonard P. Liggio & Tom G.
Palmer, Freedom and the Law: A Comment on Professor Aranson's Article, 11 HARV.
J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 713 (1988); and N. Stephan Kinsella, The Irrationalism of the Civil
Law (forthcoming).
2. It should be noted, however, that many governmental actions in the U.S. which are
in fact takings of property rights, such as zoning regulations and taxes, are not always
considered to be takings by U.S. courts. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
[Vol. 15
REDUCING POLITICAL RISK
does not have an independent judiciary to serve as a check on its
legislature.
The investor can take some comfort, however, in the recently signed
bilateral investment treaties between the U.S. and several developing
countries. These treaties contain promises by these countries guaranteeing
certain standards of treatment of U.S. investors and investments.
In addition, an investor with enough clout may be able to negotiate
directly with a host state to receive "internationalized" contractual
assurances containing "stabilization clauses" and international arbitration
clauses. These clauses provide that the law in place when the investor
initially invests will continue to apply to the investor and that disputes
between the investor and the government will be settled in a neutral
forum.
An investor can also purchase political risk insurance. This insurance
typically provides coverage against risks such as currency inconvertibility,
expropriation, and war and is available from a number of sources,
including nationally-sponsored insurance agencies, private insurers, and
the World Bank's Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency ("MIGA").
Each of these ways of controlling political risk is discussed in turn in
this Article.'
II. BILATERAL kiVESTMENT TREATIES
Political risk may be substantially reduced if a treaty to protect private
investment is in place between the foreign state and the investor's home
state. Treaties aimed specifically at protecting private foreign direct
investment are called bilateral investment treaties ("BITs"). BITs set forth
standards for treatment of foreign investors in areas such as expropriation
of property, repatriation of funds, and settlement of disputes.
While investors can, and should, use other methods to reduce political
risks-such as concession agreements4 and government-sponsored
3. Much of the material presented in this Article appeared previously in Paul E.
Comeaux & N. Stephan Kinsella, Reducing the Political Risk of Investing in Russia and
Other C.L S. Republics: International Arbitration and Stabilization Clauses, RUSSIAN OIL
& GAS GUDE, Apr. 1993, at 21; N. Stephan Kinsella & Paul E. Comeaux, United States
Bilateral Investment Treaties with Russia and Other C.L S. Republics, RUSSIAN OIL & GAS
GUEI, July 1993, at 23; Paul E. Comeaux & N. Stephan Kinsella, Political Risk and
Petroleum Investment in Russia, CURREMrs 49 (Summer 1993); Paul E. Comeaux & N.
Stephan Kinsella, Insuring Investments in Russia and Other C.LS. Republics: OPIC and
MIGA, 2, RUSSIAN OIL & GAS GUIDE, October 1993.
4. See infra Part IMI.
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insurance programs5-the presence of a treaty provides a strong incentive
for a host state to honor its obligations under international law and its
agreements with the investor. When a host state violates the rights
guaranteed to the investor by the treaty, that state has not only violated
norms of customary international law (such as the requirement to
expropriate only for a public purpose, in a nondiscriminatory fashion, and
upon the payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation6), but
has also breached a treaty with the investor's home state.
While European countries have been successfully negotiating BITs
since the late 1950s, 7 the United States did not begin to do so until the
early 1980s." In 1982, the United States announced the formulation of a
model BIT, which was updated in 1983, 1984, and again in 1987. The
model BIT is used as a starting point in all BIT negotiations conducted by
the United States. 9
It is likely that BITs will soon be in place between the United States
and several developing countries, including many of the C.I.S. republics.
As part of its on-going program of negotiating BITs with its trading
partners, especially less developed countries, the United States has signed
BITs with the Russian Federation and several other states. The U.S.-
Russia BIT received the advice and consent"0 of the U.S. Sdnate and
requires similar domestic approval from the Russian government before it
enters into force. 1
5. See infra Part IV.
6. See M. N. SHAw, INTERNATIONAL LAW 516-21 (1991).
7. "West Germany and Pakistan signed the first BIT in 1959." Jeswald W. Salacuse,
BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign
Investment in Developing Countries, 24 INT'L LAw. 655 (1990).
8. Previously, issues of private foreign investment were addressed collaterally in
treaties known as Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaties ("FCNs"). Although
the first FCN was negotiated with France by Benjamin Franklin, Arthur Lee, and Silas
Deane shortly after the signing of the Declaration of Independence, BITs were the first
treaties focused solely on these issues. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment
Treaty Program of the United States, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 201, 203-13 (1988). For
further discussion of FCNs, see id. at 204. See also Valerie H. Ruttenberg, The United
States Bilateral Investment Treaty Program: Variations on the Model, 9 U. PA. J. INT'L
BUS. L. 121 (1987).
9. Vandevelde, supra note 8, at 210-11.
10. The treaty power is granted to the President, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate, providing two-thirds of the Senators present concur. U.S. CONST. art. H,
§ 2, cl. 2.
11. Telephone Interview between Paul E. Comeaux and the Office of Treaty
Information, United States Department of State (Nov. 30, 1994).
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This section discusses the major provisions of the U.S.-Russia BIT,
as an example of a typical U.S. BIT, and examines how these provisions
will affect investors.12
A. The U.S. -Russia BIT
The BIT between America and Russia (the "U.S.-Russia BIT") was
signed in Washington, D.C. on June 17, 1992.13 It is the first BIT with
a C.I.S. Republic to be submitted for Senate consideration14 and has since
been approved by the United States Senate."5 Although the U.S.-Russia
BIT imposes obligations on both Russia and the United States with respect
to foreign investment, we focus here on Russia's obligations to American
investors under the BIT.
The issues addressed by the U.S.-Russia BIT include: the standard of
treatment of U.S. investment by Russia; the legality of and remedies for
expropriation of U.S. investments; the transfer of currency into and out
of Russia; certain provisions for the settlement of investment disputes; the
duration of the U.S.-Russia BIT; and the status of the U.S.-Russia BIT in
the event that the Russian Federation splits apart.
1. Treatment of Investment
Article II concerns the standard of treatment which Russia must
provide to U.S. investors and their investments.1" These standards fall
into two broad categories: relative treatment, which means that Russia
must treat U.S. investment as well as it treats investment from any other
12. For further discussion of BITs, see KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES
INVESTMENT TREATIES: POLICY AND PRAC-rICE (1992), and Kenneth J. Vandevelde, U.S.
Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Second Wave, 14 MICH. I. INT'L L. 621 (1993). See
also Salacuse, supra note 7; Vandevelde, supra note 8; Michael R. Reading, Note, 7he
Bilateral Investment Treaty in ASEAN A Comparative Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 679 (1992);
Eileen D. Denza & Shelagh B. Brooks, International Protection of Investment Treaties,
36 INT'L & CohM. L.Q. 909 (1987); T. Modybo Ocran, Bilateral Investment Protection
Treaties: A Comparative Study, 8 N.Y.L. SH. J. INT'L & COM,. L. 401 (1987);
Ruttenberg, supra note 8.
13. Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment,
June 17, 1992, U.S.-the Russian Federation, S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-33, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. [hereinafter U.S.-Russia BIT].
14. Letter of Submittal from Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger to President
George Bush (July 21, 1992) (included with the U.S.-Russia BfT).
15. Id.
16. U.S.-Russia BIT, supra note 13, art. IU, S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-33 at 6-9.
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country; and absolute treatment, which states that Russia must treat U.S.
investment fairly and equitably, and in accordance with international law,
regardless of how it treats non-U.S. investment.
0 Relative Standards. Paragraph 1 of Article II provides for
"relative" standards of treatment, by requiring Russia to treat U.S.
investment "on a nondiscriminatory basis" with non-U.S. investment,
subject to exceptions in certain sectors of the economy which are listed in
an Annex to the BIT.17
These relative standards are sometimes known as "national treatment"
and "most-favored-nation" ("MFN") treatment. National treatment
generally requires the host state to treat the foreign investment no less
favorably than the investment of its own nationals; MFN treatment
requires the host state to treat the investment no less favorably than it
treats the investment of any third country's investors."8 Paragraph 4(a) of
the Protocol to the U.S.-Russia BIT specifically refers to the requirement
to accord national treatment with respect to the entry of investments. 19
The exceptions listed in the Annex generally relata to matters such as
land, power production, state loans, banking, and nmass media. 20 One
significant sector in which Russia reserves the right to make exceptions is
"ownership of land and use of subsoil and natural resources."21
Attached to the U.S.-Russia BIT is a letter between the U.S. and
Russia containing an understanding of the BIT shared by both countries.
The letter states that
[b]ased on the Law of the Russian Federation on Subsoil and
legislation relating to natural resources, the Russian Federation
17. Id.
18. Vandevelde, supra note 8, at 202.
19. U.S.-Russia BIT, supra note 13, Protocol, S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-33 at 23.
20. Id.
21. It is noteworthy that in the U.S.-Russian treaty the United States
has accepted, for a period of five years, the requirement of a
special investment permission by the Russian Government for
"large-scale investments that exceed the threshold amount set forth
in the Russian Federation Law on Foreign Investments of July 4,
1991." It should be recalled that Article 16 of the Law requires
that "enterprises into which foreign investors contributed in excess
of the total of 100 million Rubles" be subject to an approval
process by the Russian Government.
Heribert Golsong, Introductory Note to Russian Federation-United States: Treaty




has reserved the right to make or maintain exceptions to national
treatment for the use of subsoil and natural resources. The
aforementioned Law on Subsoil in principle accords national
treatment to foreign investment concerning the use of
subsoil .... [T]he Russian Federation intends to continue to
accord national treatment to investments of nationals and
companies of the United States with respect to the use of subsoil
and natural resources.
Such understanding "constitutes an integral part of the
Treaty." Therefore, even though Russia reserves the right to
make exceptions to national treatment for the use of the subsoil
and natural resources, it appears to be attempting to
promise,.., without making an absolutely binding commitment,
that it will not deny national treatment to U.S. companies and
nationals investing in natural resources in Russia.'
The permitted exceptions apply only to the provisions of Paragraph
1, which concerns national treatment, and Russia has promised in the
Annex to the U.S.-Russia BIT to keep future exceptions to a minimum.
Further, "[amny future exception by [Russia or the U.S.] shall not apply
to investment existing in that sector or matter at the time the exception
becomes effective." I
9 Absolute Standards. Paragraph 2 of Article II provides for
"absolute" standards of treatment. Russia must provide the investment
with fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, and
treatment not inconsistent with the norms and principles of international
law.' Russia may not impair by arbitrary or discriminatory measures the
management, operation or other use of investments.
Finally, Russia must observe any concessions it enters into with U.S.
nationals or companies.' Because the BIT is not yet in force and could
22. Kinsella & Comeaux, supra note 3, at 24.
23. Id.
24. Certain requirements in the treaty are redundant with already-existing requirements
of international law. Although the treaty binds Russia to the requirements of international
law, by its nature international law binds Russia even when there is no BIT in place. See
Shaw, supra note 6, at 516-521.
25. Paragraph 2(c) refers to "obligations [Russia] may have entered into with regard
to investments ... ." This type of agreement is known as a concession. See id. at art.
I, (f) (defining "investment agreement" as "an agreement between a Party (or its
agencies or instrumentalities) and a national or company of the other Party concerning an
investment"). Although it is useful to have this obligation embodied in a treaty, this
1994]
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terminate in the future even after it does come into force (discussed
below), and because of Russia's power to make exceptions with respect to
natural resources, an investor would be wise to consider the use of a
concession to protect his investment, as discussed in Part III, below.
9 Other protections. Other provisions of Article II guarantee the right
of U.S. investors to bring U.S. nationals to Russia to establish and operate
the investment (Paragraph 3) and to hire top managerial personnel of their
choice, regardless of nationality (Paragraph 4). Russia is barred from
imposing on the investor requirements to export goods produced, or to
purchase goods and services locally, or other similar requirements
(Paragraph 5). Russia is to provide effective means of asserting claims
and enforcing rights related to investments and investment agreements
(Paragraph 6) and must publish all laws or regulations affecting
investments (Paragraph 7).
2. Expropriation
Provisions protecting an individual's investment from the
consequences of an expropriation or nationalization are of particular
importance-especially in an unstable regime such as Russia, which also
has a history of hostility towards private property rights.
Article III of the U.S.-Russia BIT limits Russia's right to expropriate
U.S. investments in Russia and provides for compensation when
expropriation does occur.7 The Article provides that investments shall not
be expropriated, directly or indirectly, unless performed: (1) for a public
purpose; (2) in a nondiscriminatory manner; (3) upon payment of prompt,
adequate, and effective compensation; and (4) in accordance with due
process of law and the "absolute" standards of treatment discussed above.
Realistically, although Russia would be technically in breach of a
treaty obligation, as well as customary international law, if it were to take
property in a discriminatory manner or not for a public purpose,. merely
finding Russia to have violated international law will be of little economic
benefit to an injured investor, who may well have lost millions, or even
billions, of dollars' worth of assets and other rights.
Therefore, one of the most important guarantees an investor can have
is a guarantee of compensation if an expropriation occurs. Practically
speaking, it is impossible to prevent a nation from expropriating assets it
provision is somewhat redundant, since Russia need not be a party to a treaty to be
obligated under a concession agreement. Id. at 516, and infra part III.
26. U. S.-Russia BIT, supra note 13, art. I[, S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-33 at 9-10.
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is determined to confiscate because other states would not be willing to
prevent the expropriation by force. This is especially true in the context
of the modem movement towards "permanent sovereignty over natural
resources," in which many states (typically, third-world, developing
economies) have declared that a state always retains the right to
expropriate certain assets, such as natural resources, if the "public
interest" demands it-even if the state has promised not to do so, e.g. in
a concession agreement or in a BIT.'
It is, however, more acceptable under current international law and
practice for a state to bind itself to pay compensation in the event that it
does nationalize or expropriate an investor's property. Based upon an
obligation to compensate, the courts of other nations, in certain
circumstances, are willing to enforce a damages award, against the assets
of the offending state which are located within the court's jurisdiction.28
It is seen as less of an infringement on the sovereignty of the confiscating
state to simply enforce a commitment to pay compensation than to declare
that the confiscating state may not perform expropriating acts within its
own sovereign territory.29
27. For further discussion of the concept of "permanent sovereignty over natural
resources," see G.W. Haight, The New International Legal Order and the Charter of
Rights and Duties of States, 9 INT'L LAW. 591 (1975); Andres Rozenthal, The Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the New International Legal Order, 16 VA.
J. INT'L L. 306 (1976); Charles N. Brower and John B. Tepe, The Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States, 9 INT'L LAw. 295 (1975); F. V. Garcfa-Amador, The
Proposed New International Economic Order; A New Approach to the Law Governing
Nationalization and Compensation, 12 LAw. OF THE AM. 1 (1980); Shaw, supra note 6,
at 521-23.
28. For information concerning enforcement of arbitral awards, see Ian F. 0. Baxter,
International Business Disputes, 39 INT'L & Cohe. L.Q. 288 (1990); Leo J. Bouchez,
The Prospects for International Arbitration. Disputes Between States and Private
Enterprises, 8 J. INT'L ARB. 81, 111 passim (1991); Peter M. McGowan, Arbitration
Clauses as Waivers of Immunity from Jurisdiction and Execution Under the Foreign
Sovereign Irmmunities Act of 1976, 5 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 409, 417-19
(1984); Notes: Enforcing International Commercial Arbitration Agreements and Awards
Not Subject to the New York Convention, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 75 (1982); Georges R.
Delaume, State Contracts and Transnational Arbitration, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 784 (1981);
and J. Stewart McClendon, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United States,
4 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 58 (1982).
29. It is not realistic to expect an award of specific performance, or of restitution, to
either be awarded or enforced against a sovereign state. Although the tribunal in Texaco
Overseas Petroleum Company v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, Award
on the Merits of January 19, 1977, 53 I.L.R. 389 (1979), 17 I.L.M. 1 (1978), awarded
restitution, such an award will not, in practice, be enforceable against the offending state,
nor will an award of damages be enforceable against property within the territory of the
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Thus the provision of Article III requiring "payment of prompt,
adequate and effective compensation" is one of the most potentially useful
to an investor. Such a requirement is likely to be one of the most
effective in terms of protecting the value of the investment because other
nations are more willing to enforce a damages award based on this
obligation and because Russia would be less willing to expropriate in the
first place if it would have to pay for the property it confiscates.
Of further benefit to the investor is the adoption of the "prompt,
adequate and effective compensation" standard and the further requirement
that compensation should be the "fair market value of the expropriated
investment immediately before the expropriatory action was taken or
became known ... ."30 This compensation standard is the "Hull
Formula," which is promoted by the United States but is not universally
accepted as customary international law. This standard better protects the
investor by insisting that the aggressor nation pay the true economic value
of the investment which is taken, rather than "appropriate"
compensation-an inadequate standard which is often favored by less
developed countries."
This provision also requires that compensation be paid without delay,
include interest from the date of the expropriation, be fully realizable, and
be freely transferable at a market rate of exchange." Additionally, the
state. "The problems... of enforcing such restitution awards against a recalcitrant state
may be imagined." SHAw, supra note 6, at 521-24. See also A. Z. El Chiati, Protection
of Investment in the Context of Petroleum Agreements, 4 RECUEIL DES COURS
D'ACAD~mmE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL [R.C.A.D.I.] (Collected Courses of the Hague
Academy of International Law) 9, 158 et seq. (1987). "The futility of claiming a
restitutio in integrum has become so apparent that some litigants do not even bother to
claim it." Id. at 161.
30. U.S.-Russia BIT, supra note 13, art. III., S. TREATY DOC. No. 102-33 at 10.
31. The international law principle of requiring "appropriate compensation" in such
cases was codified in U.N. General Assembly Resolution no. 1803 (XVII) of 14
December, 1962, on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, Article 4.
Government of Kuwait v. American Independent Oil Company (Aminoil), 21 I.L.M. 976,
1032 (1982), 66 I.L.R. 518 (1984). See also Texaco, 53 I.L.R. at 403-04; id. at 489
(citing the standard "appropriate compensation" with approval as a rule of customary law).
32. Since at the time of signature of the BIT there was no single market
rate of exchange in Russia, the U.S.-Russia BIT carries with it a
side letter stating that in the absence of a unified rate of exchange
in the Russian Federation at the time of ratification, the provision
in question has to be renegotiated at the request of the United
States. The same applies to a market rate for all other transfers,
referred to in Article IV (2) of the Russian BIT.
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Article prohibits indirect, as well as direct, expropriation. This provision
helps to ensure that Russia may not avoid the prohibition against
expropriation by indirectly or gradually imposing regulations 3 that have
the same economic effect as a direct expropriation.
Other provisions in Article III concern the right of an investor
complaining of an expropriation to review of the complaint by the
appropriate judicial or administrative authorities in Russia and the right of
an investor to be accorded nondiscriminatory treatment by Russia as
regards restitution, compensation or other measures following losses due
to war or revolution in Russia.
3. Currency Transfers
Although highly burdensome exchange control regulations may
constitute an expropriation, exchange control regulations which do not rise
to this level can still be very costly to investors. 3' Article IV of the U.S.-
Russia BIT addresses this concern by providing for free transfer of
currency into and out of the Host State.3S The treaty states that each
country shall allow "all transfers related to an investment to be made
freely and without delay into and out of its territory." Investors are
allowed to convert currency "into the freely convertible currency of their
choice."
The treaty gives examples of what is meant by "transfers related to
an investment." Such transfers fall into two broad categories. First, a
transfer may occur in the normal course of the investor's business.
Examples include returns and proceeds from the sale or liquidation of all
or part of an investment. Second, a transfer may occur as a payment from
Russia to the investor as compensation for a transgression. If Russia
compensates the investor for a violation of an agreement between them,
Russia may not pay the money and then refuse to allow the money to be
expatriated.
Article IV does, however, list several qualifications. Russia is
allowed to require reports of currency transfers by the investor and to
impose withholding taxes on expatriated currency. Finally, Russia is
Golsong, supra note 21, at 795.
33. Gradually increasing regulations which amount to a taking are sometimes known
as "creeping expropriation.*
34. Vandevelde, supra note 8, at 244.
35. U. S.-Russia BIT, supra note 13, art. IV, S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-33 at 11-12.
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allowed to pass laws protecting the rights of creditors, which may interfere
with an investor's right to freely transfer currency.
4. Arbitration and Settlement of Investment Disputes
Article VI of the U.S.-Russia BIT concerns the settlement of disputes
between the investor and the Host State.36 This Article covers "investment
disputes," which are defined as disputes arising over: (a) an investment
agreement between the investor and the host state; (b) the authority given
to the investor by the Host State; or (c) a breach of the U.S.-Russia BIT
itself.
If any such dispute arises, the U.S.-Russia BIT mandates that the
parties first attempt to negotiate the dispute between themselves, with or
without the help of third-party, non-binding mediation. This rule
overrides contractual provisions between the investor and the Host State
to the contrary. Thus, even if the investor and the Host State are parties
to a concession which provides that, upon violation of the concession,
either party may immediately invoke binding arbitration, the U.S.-Russia
BIT mandates that the parties must nevertheless first attempt to settle their
differences by negotiation. An investor that negotiates to resolve an
investment dispute in accordance with this provision of the U.S.-Russia
BIT should keep records of such negotiations to prevent later claims by the
Host State that no such negotiations were undertaken.
If the investment dispute cannot be resolved by negotiation between
the parties, the parties are then allowed to settle their dispute "in
accordance with previously agreed, applicable dispute-settlement
procedures." 3 7 This provision contemplates and allows dispute settlement
provisions, such as international arbitration provisions, in agreements
between a Host State and an investor .3  The U.S.-Russia BIT states that
these dispute-settlement procedures are enforceable in accordance with
"the terms of the agreement, relevant provisions of domestic law, and
applicable international agreements regarding enforcement of arbitral
awards. "19
36. Such disputes are differentiated from disputes between the U.S. and Russia
themselves, which are governed by Articles V and VII. Id. arts. V, VI, VII at 12-16.
37. Id. art. VI at 13.
38. See infra part III.
39. This provision may be interpreted to mean that dispute settlement provisions can
be invalidated by domestic law. This interpretation would allow the Host State to
invalidate an international arbitration provision that it had previously agreed to in a
concession by legislating against it. The investor can best pgotect itself from this
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Finally, Article VI provides a mechanism by which the investor may
insist upon arbitration of an investment dispute before an international
arbitral body, even if the parties did not provide for this type of dispute
resolution in their contract or concession. This provision allows
arbitration of an investment dispute before one of the following arbitral
bodies: the International Center for Investment Disputes (the "ICSID"), 4
if the Russian Federation has become a party to the treaty which
authorized ICSID; the Additional Facility of ICSID (the "Additional
Facility"); 41 the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (the "UNCITRAL Rules"); or any other
institutional arbitration facility which is agreed upon by the parties to the
dispute.
In the U.S.-Russia BIT itself, Russia gives its consent to arbitration
before the ICSID, the Additional Facility, or under the UNCITRAL Rules.
The investor has the option to consent at any time after six months from
the date that the investment dispute arose. Once the investor consents,
then either Russia or the investor may bring an action before the particular
arbitration body to which the investor has given its consent.
This provision is relevant in situations either where the dispute
settlement provisions in a contract between Russia and an investor do not
cover a particular investment dispute or where there are no investment
dispute provisions between Russia and the investor. The investor may
nevertheless invoke international arbitration by consenting to it under this
provision. However, it would be prudent for an investor to negotiate
settlement dispute mechanisms in its agreements with Russia rather than
relying upon this provision. Such dispute provisions can be tailored to the
particular needs of the investor and can include such safeguards as a
stabilization clause. 2
contingency by including a stabilization clause in any contract negotiated with a state. For
further discussion of stabilization clauses, see infra Part I.
40. The ICSID is an international arbitral institution with both a standing secretariat
and rules for arbitration between states and nationals of other states. It was formed by
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, which was signed in Washington D.C. in March of 1965. Currently, over
100 countries are parties to the ICSID Convention. As of this writing, Russia has signed
but not ratified the convention. See generally The Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes, 136 R.C.A.D.I. 330 (1972).
41. The ICSID Additional Facility is a part of the ICSID and is designed to handle
arbitration between States which are not a part of the ICSID convention and nationals of
other States.
42. For further discussion of stabilization clauses, see infra Part III.
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5. Termination of the U.S.-Russia BIT
Article XIII provides that the BIT enters into force thirty days after
it has been ratified by both the U.S. and Russia and remains in force for
at least ten years.43 Of particular importance to investors with already-
existing investments in Russia, this Article also provides that the BIT
"shall apply to investments existing at the time of entry into force as well
as to investments made thereafter."" This provision helps reduce any
incentive an investor might have to wait until the BIT is in force before
investing, and also, as a bonus, protects current investments on an equal
footing with post-BIT investments.
After the initial ten-year period, either Russia or the U.S. may, by
giving at least one year's written notice, terminate the BIT. Thereafter,
any prospective investor would be aware that the BIT was no longer in
force and could decide not to invest in Russia if the risk was felt to be too
high. For investors who had already invested in Russia, the Article
provides that the provisions of the BIT continue to be effective for a
period of ten years from the date of termination of the xeaty. Therefore,
any investor relying upon the protections afforded by the U.S.-Russia BIT
should be aware that Russia could, at any time after the initial ten-year
period, announce termination of the BIT, giving the investor benefits
under the BIT for only eleven more years (one year's notice to terminate
plus ten years after termination).
To the extent that investors require protection lasting longer than this,
other options, such as investment insurance programs or concession
agreements negotiated directly with the government that contain a longer
term than that of the BIT, should be considered.
6. Dissolution of the Russian Republic
Given recent unrest and instability in Russia, investors may
understandably be concerned that republics or parts of Russia could
separate from Russia to form one or more independent states. For
example, three of the most restless of the republics are Chechnya,
Tatarstan, and the oil-rich Bashkortostan; it is not inconceivable that these
republics could break away from Russia entirely.4
43. U3. S.-Ruse'a BIT, supra ,ott 13, w't. xfi, S. Tm.TY Doc. No. 102-33 at 19-20.
44. Id. at 19.
45. See Russia in Turmoil: A Country of Countries, ECONOMIST, Mar. 27, 1993, at 19,
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If Russia or another developing country that a signatory to a BIT were
to fragment, the provisions of any BIT would, under international law,
probably still bind the successor states. 46 This prediction is reinforced by
Article XII which provides that "Itihis Treaty shall apply to the political
subdivisions of the Parties." 47
B. BITs wT OTHER STATES
BITs have also been signed between the U.S. and the following
countries: Armenia, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Egypt, Grenada, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Morocco, Panama, Senegal, Turkey, Zaire, Argentina, the
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Congo, Haiti, Romania, Sri
Lanka, and Tunisia." Many of these BITs are very similar to the U.S.-
Russia BIT discussed above.
It is expected that the U.S. will continue to negotiate and enter into
BITs with other developing countries. 49 Additionally, "[tihere is a broad
expectation that the [U.S.-Russia BIT and the BIT between the U.K. and
Russial will serve as models for comparable treaties with other major
commercial countries."
5 0
46. See Shaw, supra note 6, at 606-11, discussing standards of international law, as
manifested in the 1978 Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in Respect of
Treaties.
47. U. S.-Russia BIT, supra note 13, art. xii, S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-33 at 19.
48. Golsong, supra note 21, at 796.
49. "BIT negotiations are underway with several of the other newly independent states
of the former Soviet Union." Letter of Submittal of U.S.-Russia BIT to the President of
the United States, luly 21, 1992, by Lawrence S. Eagleburger, included with the U.S.-
Russia BIT. "It is expected that the number of BITs will increase significantly in the near
future in view of on-going negotiations." Golsong, supra note 21, at 796. See also
Public Law 102-511-FREEDoM FOR RussIA AND EMERGING EURASIAN DEMOCRACmS
AND OPEN MARKET SUPPORT ACT OF 1992, reprinted in PRACTISINO LAW INSTITUTE,
THE IMPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC AND LEGAL REFORMS ON DOING A DEAL IN RussIA
AND UKRAINE 393 (1993), in which the Congress finds that
the success of the United States assistance for the independent states of the
former Soviet Union depends on ... reciprocal commitments by the
governments of the independent states to work toward the creation of
democratic institutions and an environment hospitable to foreign investment
based upon the rule of law, including negotiation of bilateral and multilateral
agreements on open trade and investment ....
50. Russell H. Pollack, et al., FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN RussIA: THE PERSPECTIVE OF
THE RuSSmN GOvERNMENT AND PROBLEMS FACED BY WESTERN INVESTORS, reprinted
in THE IMPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC AND LEGAL REFORMS ON DOING A DEAL IN RusSIA
AND UKRAINE 507, 516 (1993).
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III. STABILIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CLAUSES
After an individual has made a foreign investment, the political
regime may become unstable, thus rendering the investment of time and
capital worthless. As discussed in the introduction above, the investor's
options may be very limited, especially if the country does not have an
independent judiciary to serve as a check on its powers of legislation.
Furthermore, in most circumstances, the investor has no standing under
international law to appeal this type of matter to an international tribunal.
International law traditionally considers such matters purely within the
jurisdiction and discretion of the country involved."1
Investors with greater bargaining power-those with large amounts of
capital and expertise which are needed by the government to develop its
economy and exploit its resources-can often reduce these uncertainties by
asking the host state to grant specific assurances and promises which can
be enforced under international law.52 The state might provide assurance,
for example, that it will agree to settle disputes in a neutral forum (not in
the state's own courts), and a promise that the state will not later pass
internal legislation which may alter detrimentally the rights of the investor.
This section of this Article focuses on two important assurances for
which a prudent investor in any developing country should ask for before
committing his resources. This discussion of the relevant international law
principles centers around asking for these assurances in a specific type of
investor-state contract called a concession agreement, because much of the
significant international law to date concerning agreements between a
private investor and a host state focuses on concession agreements.
51. Recent trends in international law indicate that this principle may not apply if
human rights violations against the investor are involved. Such matters are beyond the
scope of this Article. See generally ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROLE-MS AND PROCESS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT (1994) and a book review of Higgins's book,
N. Stephan Kinsella, REASON PAPERS No. 20 (Fall 1995, forthcoming); Rosalyn Higgins,
The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in International Law, 3
R.C.A.D.I. 259, 355 et seq. (1982) [hereinafter Higgins, Te Taking of Property by the
Statel.
52. For a discussion of four basic arrangements between host countries and
multinational oil companies, see Ernest E. Smith & John S. Dzienkowski, A Fifty-Year
Perspective on World Petroleum Arrangements, 24 Tex. Int'l L. 13, 35 (1999). The
authors also state that "[i]t is important to note, however, that some existing agreements
have borrowed clauses and concepts from two or more types of arrangements. Thus,




The international law principles discussed here concerning concession
agreements are, however, equally applicable to other investor-state
contracts which also contain these assurances.53 Therefore, whenever an
investor negotiates an agreement directly with a state or state agency,
whether the agreement is called a concession, license, or joint venture, the
investor should attempt to negotiate the clauses discussed here.
A. THE NATURE OF CONCESSIONS
A concession is one type of contract between a state and a national of
another state. It differs from a standard contract in that one of the parties
to it is a sovereign state, which can make the relationship subject to
international law.' This difference has important ramifications for the
investor.
The most important consequence is that the concession agreement is
given international status. If the concession includes the clauses discussed
in this Article, then the state may not unilaterally change its terms without
consequence in international law, despite the fact that the obligations must
be performed in the territory of that country."5
This limit is of vital importance to the investor who wishes to invest
in a country that might be tempted to change its laws in order to
expropriate the investor's profits and assets. For example, if a well-
drafted concession contract states that the investing oil company has a right
to choose which shipping fleet to use to transport the produced oil, then
the country may not later impose unilaterally on the company a
requirement that only government-favored tankers can export oil.'
Two provisions are often inserted in concession agreements in order
to invoke these principles and to prevent the state from unilaterally
changing the terms of the concession. First, an international arbitration
clause provides that any disputes arising in relation to the concession shall
be settled before an international tribunal. This clause ensures the investor
of a neutral forum to protect its rights in the concession, including its
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco), 27 I.L.R.
117 (1963).
55. Laws which affect the investor only incidentally or which are of general importance
to the country as a whole, such as health and safety regulations, are generally upheld by
international tribunals on the theory that their necessity justifies such a taking. For a
further discussion of this topic, see H1iggins, The Taking of Property by the State, supra
note 51, and Bouchez, supra note 28, at 87.
56. 27 I.L.R. at 227-28.
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rights under the stabilization clause.57  Second, a stabilization clause,
which states that the law in force in the country at the time the concession
takes effect is the law that will apply to supplement the terms of the
contract, is often included. A stabilization clause prevents the state from
imposing new laws on the investor that would change the terms of the
concession or affect detrimentally the rights guaranteed thereunder.
The following discussion focuses on the structure and validity of
international stabilization clauses and arbitration clauses in international
contracts. 8
B. ImERNATIONAL ARBrTRAON CLAUSES
Certain types of disputes seem to recur in international oil and gas
concessions. For example, the state will often raise the investor's taxes
dramatically after promising not to do so or will nationalize the investor's
property without providing adequate compensation. A prudent investor
will negotiate an arbitration clause into the concession agreement so that,
if a dispute cannot be resolved by negotiation, these and other problems
can be settled in a neutral forum. The investor should insist that the
contract contain an international arbitration clause that stipulates
international arbitration as the method used to settle any disputes arising
in connection with the contract. The presence of an arbitration clause
serves a dual function. First, it defines the scope of an arbitration, and
57. In addition, international law is often chosen as one of the laws to be applied by
the arbitrator, as a further guarantee of neutrality. See generally David I. Branson &
Richard E. Wallace, Jr., Choosing the Substantive Law to Apply in International
Commercial Arbitration, 27 VA. I. INT'L L. 39 (1996); Chiati, supra note 29, at 121;
Bouchez, supra note 28, at 100.
58. There are many other considerations that must be taken into account when
negotiating agreements with states, which are beyond the scope of this Article. See
generally Detlev F. Vagts, Dispute-Resolution Mechanisms in International Business, 3
R.C.A.D.I. 9 (1987) and the bibliography contained therein; Chiati, supra note 29 and
the bibliography contained therein; ERNEST E. SMITH & JOHN S. DzENKowsl,
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM TRANSACTIONS INSTITUTE (November 20, 1992, Houston,
Texas, sponsored by The University of Texas School of Law, a version of which was also
recently published as SMITH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM TRANSACTIONS (1993),
available from the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation); GEORGES R. DELAUME,
TRANSNATIONAL CoNTRACrs: APPLICABLE LAW AND SETTLEME4T OF DISPUTES (1982);
RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (1992); A.F.
LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE INVESTMENT (2d ed. 1982); ALAN REDFERN &
MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
(1986); Note, Unilateral Action by Oil Producing Countries: Possible Contractual
Remedies of Foreign Petroleum Companies, 9 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 63 (1985-1986).
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procedures and details by which the arbitration shall be conducted.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, it is important to establish the
jurisdiction of an arbitrator to hear the matter.
1. Structure
A typical ad hoc international arbitration clause provides detailed
provisions, including: the scope of the clause; the method by which a
party can invoke arbitration; the method for choosing the arbitrators; the
applicable procedural and substantive laws; the procedure if one party
refuses to participate; the method by which the arbitrators render a
decision; and the time period within which the parties must comply with
the results of the arbitration.59 In addition, the clause usually states that
the decision of the arbitrators is binding. To illustrate, a portion of the
international arbitration clause found in the concession agreement that was
the subject of the BP v. Libyan Arab Republic arbitration is set forth
below. The first paragraph of the arbitration clause establishes the consent
of the parties to arbitration, the scope of any arbitration, and the method
for choosing an arbitrator and reads as follows:
If at any time during or after the currency of this Concession
any difference or dispute shall arise between the Government and
the Company concerning the interpretation or performance
hereof, or anything herein contained or in connection herewith,
or the rights and liabilities of either of such parties hereunder and
if such parties should fail to settle such difference or dispute by
agreement, the same shall, failing any agreement to settle it any
other way, be referred to two Arbitrators, one of whom shall be
appointed by each such party, and an Umpire who shall be
appointed by the Arbitrators immediately after they are
themselves appointed.
In the event of the Arbitrators failing to agree upon an
Umpire within 60 days from the date of the appointment of the
second Arbitrator, either of such parties may request the
President or, if the President is a national of Libya or of the
Country where the Company was incorporated, the Vice-
59. See, e.g., BP Exploration Company (Libya) Limited v. Government of the Libyan
Arab Republic, 53 LL.R. 291, 302 (1979).
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President, of the International Court of Justice to appoint the
Umpire.'
The remainder of the arbitration clause concerns the matters referred to in
the paragraph immediately above.
As an alternative to ad hoc arbitration, which sets out the procedures
and administrative details of a possible arbitration in full detail, parties can
choose to have their arbitration managed by an international arbitration
system. The ICSID is one of several organizations that provide a detailed
arbitration system, a list of experienced arbitrators, and administrative
amenities.61
2. Validity and Effect
An international arbitration clause, in addition to defining the scope,
procedure, and administrative details of an arbitration, also grants
authority to an arbitrator to claim jurisdiction over a dispute. This
authority is important, as often a state will object to the jurisdiction of the
arbitrator and will refuse to recognize the validity of the proceedings.
Establishing a firm basis in international law for the validity of the
tribunal's authority will assist the investor in later efforts to enforce any
award.
International case law confirms that an arbitrator has jurisdiction to
decide whether he has authority to hear a matter presented to him.62 One
of the factors which is often cited in the arbitrator's "jurisdiction to decide
jurisdiction" is the express consent of the parties. This consent is found
in the arbitration clause. As an example, the arbitration clause in the
Texaco concession contains the following phrase:" "The Arbitrators...
shall determine the applicability of this Clause and the procedure to be
60. Id. at 302.
61. See Vagts, supra note 58 (discussing international arbitration mechanisms,
including a comparison of ad hoc and institutionalized arbitration). See also Bouchez,
supra note 28, at 93 passim; William W. Park, Arbitration of International Contract
Disputes, 39 Bus. LAW. 1783 (1984).
62. See Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1953 I.C.J. 111, 20 I.L.R. 567 (1953);
Concerning the Arbitral Award Made by The King of Spain on December 23, 1906
(Hond. v. Nicar.), 1960 I.C.J. 192, 30 I.L.R. 457 (1966).
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followed in the Arbitration."' The arbitrator in the Texaco case cited this
phrase as one of the justifications for assuming jurisdiction.6
If the arbitrator decides that he has jurisdiction, then jurisdiction
cannot be revoked unilaterally by the state. International law dictates that
a government bound by an arbitration clause cannot free itself of this
obligation by unilateral action, such as by changing its internal law or by
unilaterally rescinding the contract.' "It is well-established in case law
that the unilateral cancellation of a contract can have no effect on the
arbitration clause which continues to be operative .... "6 An arbitration
clause is severable from the remainder of the concession and thus cannot
be nationalized by the state even where the state nationalizes other rights
contemplated by the concession agreement.
C. STABILIZATION CLAUSES
A stabilization clause states that the law in force in the state at a given
date-typically, the time the concession takes effect-is the law that will
apply to supplement the terms of the contract, regardless of future
legislation, decrees, or regulations issued by the government. 7 Its
purpose is to "preclude the application to an agreement of any subsequent
legislative (statutory) or administrative (regulatory) act issued by the
government ... that modifies the legal situation of the investor."6 In
other words, by agreeing to a stabilization clause, a state alienates its right
to unilaterally change the regime and rights relied upon by, and promised
to, the investor.
63. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v. The
Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 53 I.L.R. 389, 403-04 (1979).
64. Id.
65. Jimnez de Ar6chega, L'Arbitrage Entre les Etats et les Socits Privies
Etranglres, in MALMGES EN L'HONNEUR DE GILBERT GDEL 367, 375 (1961) cited in
Texaco, 53 I.L.R. at 410.
66. Losinger, 1936 P.C.I.J. (Ser. C) No. 78, at 105, cited in Texaco, 53 I.L.R. at
408.
67. Principles of international law may also apply. The state's municipal law, as it
stands on a given date, is often chosen as the law to govern certain local matters. See
generally Chiati, supra note 29.
68. Id. at 115. For examples of various stabilization clauses, see id. at 115-21.
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1. Structure
The concession contract between the parties in Liamco v. Libya
provides a good example of a stabilization clause and states:
(1) The Government of Libya, the Commission and the
appropriate provincial authorities will take all steps necessary to
ensure that the Company enjoys all the rights conferred by this
Concession. The contractual rights expressly created by this
Concession shall not be altered except by mutual consent of the
parties.
(2) This Concession shall throughout the period of its
validity be construed in accordance with the Petroleum Law and
the Regulations in force on the date of execution of the
Agreement of Amendment by which this paragraph [sic] (2) was
incorporated into this Concession Agreement. Any amendment
to or repeal of such Regulations shall not affect the contractual
rights of the Company without its consent.6
The first paragraph makes clear that mutual consent of the parties is
needed to alter the contractual rights secured by the concession. The
second paragraph establishes that the municipal law by which the
concession is to be interpreted is fixed as of a certain date, so that no later
government legislation or action can unilaterally infringe upon the
company's contractual rights.
The key element of the stabilization clause is the removal of the
government's right to unilaterally alter the investor's rights by changing
its municipal law; this element is made more explicit by the requirement
that the investor's consent is necessary before any such change in law will
affect the investor.70
69. Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO) v. Government of the Libyan Arab
Republic, Award of 12 April 1977, 62 I.L.R. 140, 170 (1980); 20 I.L.M. 1 (1981).
70. The first paragraph, in requiring mutual consent to change the concession contract,
is sometimes referred to as an "intangibility clause" to distinguish it from a stabilization
clause, which freezes the law as of a certain date. See, e.g., Bouchez, supra note 28, at
86. Most such clauses, however, combine both complementary aspects. Chiati, supra note
29, at 115-16. Therefore, the term "stabilization clause" in this article will refer to both




2. Validity and Effect
International law upholds both the validity of stabilization clauses and
the right of a sovereign nation to bind itself through the use of such
clauses.7" The tribunal in Texaco v. Libyan Arab Repubic 2 stated that
"[n]othing can prevent a State, in the exercise of its sovereignty, from
binding itself irrevocably by the provisions of a concession and from
granting to the concessionaire irretractable rights .... "7 The tribunal
in Texaco held that, "in entering into concession contracts with the
plaintiffs, the Libyan State did not alienate but exercised its
sovereignty."74 Some nations protest, however, that it is an infringement
on their sovereignty for a tribunal to rule that they may not legislate in a
way that would violate the terms of a concession agreement.
A stabilization clause is valid in principle under international law,
although arbitrators differ as to the consequences of the violation of such
a clause.7' Generally, arbitrators will not order specific performance of
a concession agreement, even if it contains a stabilization clause, out of
respect for state sovereignty and an inability to enforce such an award (the
remedy in Texaco, discussed below, is an exception to this rule). Instead,
a state's violation of a stabilization clause is more likely to affect the
amount of damages awarded or on the certainty that damages will be
awarded.76
71. See, e.g., Chiati, supra note 29, at 161 (stating that "[sitabilization clauses, validly
entered into, are valid and binding").
72. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v. The
Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 53 I.L.R. at 474, (quoting Saudi Arabia v.
Arabian American Oil Company, Award of August 23, 1958, (Aramco), 27 I.L.R. 117,
168).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 482 (emphasis added). See also Bouchez, supra note 28, at 86 (discussing
a similar holding by the Permanent Court of International Justice, in the Wimbledon Case,
1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1, at 25).
75. As stated in LLAMCO, international law is unclear on the question of damages.
LIAMCO, 62 I.L.R. at 160 et seq. See also Shaw, supra note 6, at 521.
76. See Chiati, supra note 29, at 165 (stating that "the extent of the indemnity due to
the investor... may vary from compensation for the value of the property taken to the
financial equivalent of restitution and may even include, at least theoretically, punitive
damages") (footnote omitted). See also SHAw, supra note 6, at 523-24. For a critique
of this position, see ROsALYN HIGGINs, supra note 51, at Chapter 8; Kinsella, supra note
51; and N. Stephan Kinsella & Paul E. Comeaux, Expropriation and International Law:
The Illusory Requirements of Nondiscrimination and Public Purpose (forthcoming).
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The decisions in several major international arbitrations are discussed
below to examine the current state of international law concerning
stabilization clauses. In Texaco, Libya nationalized the property and rights
of several oil companies in violation of a concession agreement." The
concession contained a stabilization clause very similar to the Liamco
clause discussed above. The tribunal recognized the validity of a
stabilization clause in a concession agreement. The clause was one factor
in the tribunal's decision to declare the taking illegal and to render an
award of restitution (i.e., a return of the property the government
nationalized).78 The tribunal stated that this award was "the normal
sanction for non-performance of contractual obligations,"" although the
award was in fact atypical. Nevertheless, the tribunal held that where the
contract was stabilized on a certain date by specific clauses, "the decision
of a State to take nationalizing measures . . . carries international
consequences . . . . "80 This holding demonstrates the potential
significance of a stabilization clause to help convince an arbitrator to grant
a remedy to an aggrieved investor.
In Liamco v. Libya, Libya had awarded concessions to Liamco in
1955 and then nationalized the concession rights in 1973.1 The tribunal
held this nationalization to be a breach of the concession and awarded
approximately $80 million as damages. 2 The concession's stabilization
clause was discussed earlier in this article. The tribunal held 3 that a
"nationalization of concession rights... constitutes... a source of
liability to compensate the concessionaire for said premature termination
of the concession agreement."" The court did not award lucrum cessans
(i.e., lost profits) to the investor; consequently, the investor did not
receive compensation for the full value of what was taken. However, the
77. Texaco, 53 I.L.R. at 422.
78. Id. at 507. The award of restitution against a state is rare in concession cases;
usually any award given is for damages only. For a discussion of the remedy of restittio
in integrwn, see Higgins, The Taking of Property by the State, supra note 51, at 298-355.
79. Texaco, 53 I.L.R. at 507.
80. Id. at 471.
81. LIAMCO, 62 I.L.R. at 160-181.
82. Id. at 218.
83. The holding was made partially because of the stabilization clause's provision that
"contractual rights expressly created by this Concession shall not be altered except by
mutual consent of the parties." Id. at 191.
84. Id. at 217.
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fact that a stabilization clause was present was one of the factors
considered in the award of "equitable compensation"I s by the tribunal.
A recent international arbitration that contains a significant discussion
of stabilization clauses is the Aminoil arbitration."6 In 1948, Aninoil was
granted a concession by Kuwait "for the exploration and exploitation of
petroleum and natural gas in what was then called the Kuwait 'Neutral
Zone'."' 7 In 1961, Kuwait became fully independent, and the concession
was modified by a supplemental agreement. In December 1974, OPEC
countries adopted the "Abu Dhabi formula," which effectively raised taxes
on the oil produced by Aminoil, to which Aminoil objected.8
Negotiations between the parties were unsuccessful, and Kuwait
expropriated Aminoil's assets in 1977.89 In the ensuing arbitration,
Aminoil claimed that this action was a breach of the stabilization clause
contained in the concession agreement. The stabilization clause reads:
The Shaikh shall not by general or special legislation or by
administrative measures or by any other act whatever annul this
Agreement except as provided in Article 11. No alteration shall
be made in the terms of this Agreement by either the Shaikh or
the Company except in the event of the Shaikh and the Company
jointly agreeing that it is desirable in the interest of both parties
to make certain alterations, deletions or additions to this
Agreement. 90
The tribunal stated that stabilization clauses are valid in principle, although
it reasoned that this particular clause did not accomplish what it clearly
contemplates on its face.
First, the tribunal held that the stabilization clause did not prohibit
nationalization because it contained no express prohibition.91  The
85. Id. at 217-18.
86. Government of Kuwait v. American Independent Oil Company (Aminoil), 66
I.L.R. 519, 519-31 (1984).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. See also Fernando R. Tes6n, State Contracts and Oil Expropriations: The
Aminoil-Kuwait Arbitration, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 323 (1984); Geoffrey Marston, The
Aminoil-Kuwait Arbitration, 17 J. WORLD TRADE L. 177 (1983) (both discussing the
Aninoil case).
90. Aminoil, 66 I.L.R. at 519-3 1.
91. Id.
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arbitrator stated that a "contractual limitation on the state's right to
nationalize ... would be a particularly serious undertaking which would
have to be expressly stipulated for. . . . "' He stated further that "[tihe
case of nationalisation is certainly not expressly provided against by the
stabilisation clauses of the Concession."" Thus, this particular clause did
not prevent nationalization despite its apparently clear wording.
Second, the tribunal held that the fact that Aminoil agreed during
protracted negotiations to allow changes to the concession "brought about
a metamorphosis in the whole character of the Concession."" The
tribunal's position, in essence, was that since the investor had been willing
to compromise during negotiations, the investor had in effect implicitly
agreed to a weakening of the stabilization clause. Therefore, under this
diluted or weakened stabilization clause, a nationalization was permissible
under the concession agreement as long as compensation was paid. 95
The tribunal held that the existence of the clause merely warranted an
award of damages, despite the wording of the stabilization clause which
seemed to clearly prohibit unilateral changes in law. Nevertheless, the
existence of the stabilization clause-even weakened-was an important
element in the tribunal's justification of the award of damages. The
standard used to determine the amount of damages was that of
"appropriate compensation."s
The investor negotiating a stabilization clause should learn two
valuable lessons from this case. The first is that a stabilization clause
should be very explicit in what it is meant to prohibit. The clause should
provide that the state expressly waives its right to nationalize. The second
is that a stabilization clause should provide that its terms are binding
regardless of subsequent compromises, negotiations, or amendments to the
contract unless both parties provide expressly, in writing, to change the
meaning or binding effect of the stabilization clause. This flexibility will





96. Id. at 527. For the international law principle of requiring "appropriate
compensation" in such cases, see Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, para.
4, G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR, reprinted in DusAN I. DJoNOvICH, 9 UNITED NATIONS
RmsoLmuIONS, SERIs 1, RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY TiE GEuNeRAL ASSEMBLY, 1962-
1963, at 107 (1974). See also Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 53 I.L.R. at 489 (citing the standard "appropriate compensation" with approval
as a rule of customary law).
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circumstances change, without fear that a tribunal may later declare that
the fact that the investor had agreed to these negotiations and somehow
weakened or changed the nature of the stabilization clause.'
3. Enforceability of Awards of Damages
The relevance of a stabilization clause in international law is not that
it will be, or even can be, specifically enforced,9" but rather that it makes
damages awarded by an international tribunal either more certain to be
awarded or likely to be higher than if a stabilization clause were not
present. An award of damages, besides helping to bring international
opinion and pressure to bear upon the nationalizing state and thereby
aiding in settlement negotiations between the parties, may sometimes be
recognized and enforced in national courts against property of the
defendant state within the court's jurisdiction.
Various international agreements and treaties are currently in force
which are designed to assist in the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.
Perhaps the most important is the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, first signed in New York in
1958, which provides for enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.9 This
provision is useful where the assets of parties may be situated in different
countries and transnational enforcement is desired." ° Obtaining an award
of damages is desirable, despite problems in enforcement, as it increases
the chances an investor has of obtaining compensation from the offending
state. Furthermore, the mere prospect of having an award granted to an
expropriated investor will help to dissuade a state from taking the
investor's property in the first place.
97. The separate opinion of Sir G. Fitzmaurice in Andnoil, 66 I.L.R. at 524-31, which
is better reasoned than the main opinion, concurs in the judgment. Fitzmaurice reasons
differently and states that stabilization clauses do not need to be express to be effective,
that this clause was express anyway, and that the character of the concession or of the
stabilization clause had not changed due to subsequent negotiations and amendments. Id.
98. Although the tribunal in Texaco awarded restitution, such an award will not, in
practice, be enforceable against the offending state, nor will an award of damages be
enforceable against property within the territory of the state. "The problems ... of
enforcing such restitution awards against a recalcitrant state may be imagined." SHAW,
supra note 6, at 521-24. See also Chiati, supra note 29, at 158. "The futility of claiming
a resfitutio in integrum has become so apparent that some litigants do not even bother to
claim it." Id. at 161.
99. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, 1959.
100. Id.
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4. Damages Clause
One of the benefits of having a stabilization clause is the likelihood
of a higher damages award than would otherwise be expected.
An additional method to help guarantee the award of the full value of
the rights taken is for the investor to negotiate a damages clause. The
damages clause should provide that if the state nevertheless expropriates
the investor's property or other rights, the state is obliged to compensate
the investor for the full value, including lost profits (i.e., both damnum
emergens and lucrum cessans).
An example of this type of clause is found in a recent Ghanaian
concession contract, which contained an arbitration clause with the
following paragraph:
If any Contractor's rights, interests or property provided for
herein are expropriated, nationalized or otherwise taken by
reason of any act of the State or any central or local
governmental authority of Ghana, then the arbitrators shall apply
the principle of full and fair compensation for loss of profits
determined on the basis of a going concern.10'
The term "full and fair," and even the term "lost profits," may be subject
to conflicting interpretations. The damages clause should therefore
provide for a specific method to determine valuation, in order to avoid
disputes over which accounting method is proper. This clause, if well
drafted, would also make a state more reluctant to expropriate in the first
place, since much of the temptation to take property is removed if the
expropriating party must pay for the expropriated property. Several
decisions and authorities indicate that the amount of damages awarded may
be higher if the expropriation is considered illegal under international
law."° The concept of international "illegality" is a vague and uncertain
101. Chiati, supra note 29, at 166.
102. See SHAw, supra note 6, at 523-24. For a critique of this position, see ROSALYN
HIGGINS, supra note 51, at Chapter 8. For further discussion of compensation issues, see
C.F. Amerasinghe, Issues of Compensationfor the Takings of Alien Property in the Light
of Recent Cases and Practice, 41 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 22 (1992); Patrick M. Norton, A
Law of the Future or a Law of the Past? Modern Tribunals and the International Law of
Expropriation, 85 Am. 1. INT'L L. 474 (1991); Charles N. Brower, Current Developments
in the Law of Expropriation and Compensation: A Preliminary Survey of Awards of the
Iran-United States Claimns Tribunal, 21 INT'L LAw. 639 (1987); Derek William Bowett,
State Contracts with Aliens: Contemporary Developments on Compensation for
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one. Therefore, it would be advantageous for the investor to have the
stabilization clause provide further that any nationalization or expropriation
contrary to the terms of the agreement is, and is deemed to be by both
parties, illegal and unlawful under international law. This provision
should help to further ensure an award of damages which compensates the
investor for the full value of the property and other contractual rights
taken.
D. INVESTOR-STATE CoNTRACIm IN DEVELOPING CouNTRIEs
The various clauses recommended in this Article should be of
particular importance to an individual investing in developing countries
that do not have impressive track records of protecting private property.
Since the states' own internal laws are less likely to give the investor
protection under international law, an investor should attempt to have these
clauses included in any contracts negotiated with these states, whether or
not a particular state has in place its own laws purporting to protect
foreign investment. It is likely that many states will be willing to enter
into such concessions, since international arbitration between states and
investors has been growing in importance recently. 0 3 Therefore, investors
Termination or Breach, 59 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 49 (1988); Eli Lauterpacht, Issues of
Compensation and Nationality in the Taking of Energy Investments, 8 J. ENERGY & NAT.
RESOURCEs L. 241 (1990); Brice M. Clagett, Present State of the International Law of
Compensation for Expropriated Property and Repudiated State Contracts, in PRlvATE
INVESTORS ABROAD 12-1 (1989); William C. Lieblich, Determining the Economic Value
of Expropriated Income-Producing Property in International Expropriations, 8 1. INT'L
ARE. 37 (1991); William C. Lieblich, Determinations by International Tribunals of the
Economic Value of Expropriated Enterprises, 7 1. INT'L ARB. 37 (1990); Edith Penrose
et al., Nationalization of Foreign-Owned Property for a Public Purpose: An Economic
Perspective on Appropriate Compensation, 55 MOD. L. REv. 351 (1992); Felix Praendl,
Note, Measure of Damages in International Cormnercial Arbitration, 23 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 263 (1987); Haliburton Fales, A Comparison of Compensation for Nationalization of
Alien Property with Standards of Compensation Under United States Domestic Law, 5
Nw. I. INT'L L. & Bus. 871 (1983); James W. Weller, International Parties, Breach of
Contract, and the Recovery of Future Profits, 15 HoPSTRA L. REv. 323 (1987);
Christopher P. Bauman, An International Standard of Partial Compensation upon the
Expropriation of an Alien's Property, 19 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 103 (1987).
103. "In recent years there has been an increase in the activity and promotion of
international arbitration." Baxter, supra note 28, at 299. "IT]aking into account the
growing importance of international commercial arbitration with respect to international
dealings between private parties-including international transactions between private
parties and State enterprises ... it is to be expected that international arbitration will
continue to play an important role between States and State enterprises on the one hand
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may be successful in having these clauses inserted in contracts with at least
some of the developing countries, if they insist upon them in negotiations.
IV. MIGA, OPIC, & PRIVATE INVESTMENT INSURANCE
Individuals investing in developing countries face risks, such as the
risk of currency inconvertibility and expropriation, which are much greater
than the risks experienced by investors who invest in Western liberal
democracies. Other than relying upon the existence of BITs1t 4 and
negotiating contractual assurances such as stabilization and international
arbitration clauses,"05 an investor can also reduce political risk by
purchasing political risk insurance. This insurance typically provides
coverage against risks such as currency inconvertibility, expropriation, and
war and is available from a number of sources, including nationally-
sponsored insurance agencies, 1" private insurers, and the World Bank's
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency ("MIGA"). This Article
focuses on MIGA and on the U.S. government-sponsored insurance
agency, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation ("OPIC"), 0 7 which
and foreign private parties on the other." Bouchez, supra note 28, at 115. For further
discussion an investor's ability to obtain concession agreements from Russia, see Comeaux
& Kinsella, Reducing The Political Risk of Investing in Russia and Other C. I. . Republics:
International Arbitration and Stabilization Clauses, supra note 3, at 21. See also Political
Risk and Petroleum Investment in Russia, supra note 3, at 48; N. Stephan Kinsella,
Lithuania's Proposed Foreign Investment Laws: A Free-Market Critique, RussIAN OIL &
GAS GUIDE, Vol. 3, No. 2, at 60 (April 1993).
104. See discussion supra Part 1.
105. See discussion supra Part M11.
106. The largest government-sponsored insurance agencies, which are the U.S.
Overseas Private Investment Corporation, Germany's Treuarbeit, and the Japanese Export
Insurance Division, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, together represent over
80 percent of all outstanding national insurance coverage. Malcolm D. Rowat,
Multilateral Approaches to Improving the Investment Climate ofDeveloping Countries: The
Cases of ICSID and MIGA, 33 HARV. INT'L L.J. 103, 119, 122 (1992).
107. For further information on OPIC and MIGA, see The Overseas Private
Investment CorporationAct, 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 2191-2200b (West 1990 & Supp. 1993); The
Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, opened for
signature October 11, 1985, 24 LL.M. 1598 (entered into force April 12, 1988), cited in
Rowat, supra note 106, at n.9; U.S. laws relating to MIGA in 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 290k to
290k-1l (West 1990); Steven Franklin & Gerald T. West, The Overseas Private
Investment Corporation Amnendments Act of 1978: A Reaffirnation of the Developmental
Role of Investment Insurance, 14 TEx. INT'L L.J. 1 (1979) (providing a complete
discussion of the origins and background of OPIC); IBRAHim F. I. SHIHATA, MIGA AND
FOREIGN INVEsTmENT-ORIGINs, OPERATIONS, POLICIES AND BASIC DocumENfs OF THE
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are the insurance providers of the most interest to U.S. investors. In




OPIC, established under the Foreign Assistance Act in 1969,109 is a
self-sustaining U.S. government agency that provides political risk
insurance, as well as project financing through direct loans and loan
guarantees and a variety of investor services, to U.S. investors. OPIC's
insurance is "backed by the full faith and credit of the United States, as
well as by OPIC's own substantial reserves."110 OPIC services are
available for U.S. investments in more than 139 developing nations. Its
goal is to encourage American overseas private investment in sound
business projects, thereby improving U.S. global competitiveness, creating
American jobs, and increasing U.S. exports. OPIC's political risk
insurance is discussed in detail below.
MULTILATERAL INVEsTMENT GUARANTEE AGENCY (MIGA) (1988). See also Gary W.
Orloff, Private Political Risk Insurance for Energy Investors (Maclean International
Energy Network, Going International Seminar, Dallas, Texas), July 28, 1993; Klaus P.
Berger, The New Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency Globalizing the Investment
Insurance Approach Towards Development, 15 SYRACUSE. J. INT'L L. & COM. 13 (1988);
Ibrahim F. . Shihata, Factors Influencing the Flow of Foreign Investment and the
Relevance of a Multilateral Investment Guarantee Scheme, 21 INT'L LAW. 671 (1987)
[hereinafter Shihata, Factors]; Adeoye Akinsanya, International Protection of Direct
Foreign Investment in the Third World, 36 INT'L & Cowp. L.Q. 58 (1987); S. K.
Chatterjee, The Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency,
36 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 76 (1987); Ibrahim F. . Shihata, Towards a Greater
Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Role of ICSID and MIGA, 1 ICSID REV. 1
(1986).
108. Much of the following discussion of OPIC draws on information obtained directly
from OPIC. See e.g., the "Investment Insurance" pamphlet and related information
supplied by OPIC. OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION, INVESTMENT
INsURANCE (n.d.).
109. John S. Diaconis, Political Risk Insurance: OPIC's Use of a "Fiduciary Agent"
to Facilitate Resolution of Subrogation Caims, 23 INT'L LAW. 271 (1989).
110. OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION, supra note 108, at 1.
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2. Risks Covered by ePIC Insurance
OPIC will insure both new ventures and expansions of existing
enterprises and can cover equity investments, loans, technical assistance
agreements, leases, and other investment structures which subject the
investor to long-term exposure. The investor may purchase insurance
coverage for one or more of the following three types of risks: (1)
currency inconvertibility, which is the inability to convert profits and other
remittances into U.S. dollars; (2) expropriation, which is the confiscation
of the investor's property by the host state; and (3) political violence,
which includes war, revolution, insurrection, and civil strife. In addition,
OPIC offers specialized insurance coverage for certain specific types of
investments, including specialized insurance for oil and gas-related
investments.
a. Currency Inconvertibility
Currency inconvertibility insurance coverage conpensates investors
if they cannot convert remittances from the local currency into U.S.
dollars and transfer those remittance outside of the host country. It
includes earnings, returns of capital, principal and interest payments,
technical assistance fees, and other remittances related to investment
projects. This coverage also extends to losses to the investor caused by
discriminatory exchange rates."' Currency inconvertibility coverage does
not extend to the devaluation of a country's currency. In addition, the
investor may only collect on currency inconvertibility insurance if the




Expropriation insurance protects against the nationalization,
confiscation, or expropriation of an enterprise as well as creeping
expropriation, which is defined as a series of illegal government actions
that cumulatively deprive an investor of the financial interests in his
investment. Expropriation coverage excludes losses due to lawful
regulatory or revenue actions by host governments and actions provoked
or instigated by the investor or foreign enterprise. For equity investments,




the amount of compensation is based on the book value of the investment
as of the date of expropriation. For loans, payment is based on
outstanding principal and accrued interest.
c. Political Violence
Political violence insurance compensates for property and income
losses caused by violence undertaken for political purposes. Examples of
the types of violence covered are declared war, undeclared war, hostile
actions by national or international forces, civil war, revolution,
insurrection, and civil strife. Civil strife may be included or excluded
from coverage, at the investor's option. Actions undertaken primarily to
achieve labor or student objectives are not covered. The insurance may
cover one or both of two types of losses-business income losses and
damage to property. An investor may purchase one or both coverages.
Business income loss coverage includes income losses resulting from
damage to the investor's property caused by political violence. With an
"off-site" rider, OPIC will provide compensation for income losses
resulting from damage to specific sites outside the investor's facility.
Compensation is based on expected net income plus continuing, normal
operating expenses. OPIC also will pay for expenses that reduce the
business income loss, such as renting a temporary facility. Compensation
is paid until productive capacity is restored, for a time period not to
exceed one year.
"Damage to property" compensation is based on the adjusted cost of
the property or replacement cost. Adjusted cost is defined as the least of
the original cost of the item, the fair market value at the time of loss, or
the cost to repair the item. OPIC will pay replacement cost up to twice
the equipment's original cost, provided the item is actually replaced in the
host country.
d. Special Oil and Gas Insurance
OPIC offers specialized insurance coverage to encourage petroleum
exploration, development, and production in developing countries. In
addition to insurance coverage for the risks discussed above, an investor
may purchase "exploration" coverage and "interference with operations"
coverage.
Exploration coverage expands expropriation coverage to insure against
losses due to material changes unilaterally imposed by a host government
on project agreements. These changes include an abrogation, impairment,
repudiation, or breach of concession agreements, production sharing
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agreements, service contracts, risk contracts, and other agreements
between the U.S. company and the host state. Such actions must last for
at least six months and prevent the insured from effectively exercising its
fundamental rights with respect to the project agreement, such as rights to
take and export petroleum or to be paid for it. The coverage also
compensates for tangible assets and bank accounts that are confiscated.
Interference with operations coverage expands political violence
coverage to insure against cessation of operations for six months or more
caused by political violence. Compensation for such cessation is based on
the amount of investment, less returns of capital. Compensation must be
repaid to OPIC, without interest, if within five years the political violence
has abated and the insured can resume operations.
3. Eligibility for OPIC Insurance
OPIC political risk insurance may only be issued if the investor, the
foreign country, and the investment itself meet OPIC's requirements. In
addition, OPIC will take certain political requirements into account. These
eligibility requirements are discussed in more detail below.
a. Eligible Investors
To be eligible for OPIC insurance, an investor must be: a U.S.
citizen; a corporation, partnership, or other association created under the
laws of the U.S., its states, or territories beneficially owned by U.S.
citizens; or a foreign business at least 95 % owned by U.S. citizens or by
associations owned by U.S. citizens.
b. Eligible Projects
An investment project qualifies for OPIC insurance coverage if the
investment is a new investments, a privatization, or an expansion or
modernization of an existing plant or investment. Acquisitions of existing
operations are eligible if the investor contributes additional capital for
modernization and/or expansion There is no requirement that the foreign
enterprise be owned or controlled by U.S. investors. However, in the
case of a project with foreign ownership, only the portion of the
investment made by the U.S. investor is insured by OPIC. Insurance is
normally not available for investments in enterprises which are majority-
owned and controlled by a foreign government.
. Investments may take many forms: conventional equity investments
and loans; construction and service contracts; production sharing
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agreements; leases; and various contractual arrangements, such as
consigned inventory, licensing, franchising, and technical assistance
agreements.
Finally, the investor must submit a Request for Registration for
Political Risk Investment Insurance before the investment is made or
irrevocably committed.
c. Eligible Countries
OPIC may not offer insurance for a project in a country with which
the U.S. does not have an investment agreement."' Currently, OPIC
programs are available in 140 developing countries.114 Investors should
contact OPIC to determine the status of OPIC assistance in a particular
country.
Under agreements with the host countries, the host government must
approve the issuance of OPIC insurance for a project. The approval
procedures vary from country to country and are available from OPIC.
113. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2197(a) (West Supp. 1994).
114. OPIC's "Country and Area List" lists countries in which OPIC programs are
generally available: Albania, Algeria, Anguilla, Antigua & Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia,
Aruba, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin,
Bolivia, Botswana, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Cook
Islands, Costa Rica, C6te d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Djibouti, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia,
Fiji, French Guiana, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany (eastern), Ghana, Greece,
Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, India,
Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan,
Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta,
Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Federated States of Micronesia, Moldova,
Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua,
Niger, Nigeria, Northern Ireland, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, St. Kitts & Nevis, St.
Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, San Tome & Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Taiwan, Tajikistan,
Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan,
Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Western
Samoa, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe. OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, COUNTRY AND AREA LIST (January 12, 1993).
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d. Political Considerations
OPIC has a legislative mandate to support projects which are
responsive to the development needs and the environment of the host
country and which foster private initiative and competition. In particular,
OPIC must give preferential treatment to investments in countries with a
per capita annual income of less than $984 in 1986 U.S. dollars.'" If a
project is given monopoly rights or other competitive advantages for more
than five years, special justification for OPIC involvement is required.
The effect of a proposed investment on the U.S. economy also is
closely examined. Coverage is denied to projects which are likely to have
a negative impact on U.S. employment and where the host country
imposes requirements that substantially reduce the potential U.S. trade
benefits of the investment.
OPIC also may decline coverage to projects which are likely to have
a significant adverse effect on the U.S. balance of payments. OPIC also




The term of an insurance policy may extend a maximum of twenty
years. For loans, leases, and transactions covered by the contractors and
exporters program, the term is generally equal to the duration of the
underlying contract.
b. Cost
OPIC insurance premiums are based on fixed rate schedules, which
are determined by reference to the type of investment and the types of
coverage sought.11 7  As an example, OPIC's current base rates for
coverage on oil and gas investments are as follows: for expropriation,
0.4 % for development/exploration, and 1.5 % for production; for political
violence, 0.75 %; for interference with operations, 0.4 %; and for currency
inconvertibility, 0.3%."'8
115. Diawois, supra note 109, at 275.
116. Rowat, supra note 106, at 122.
117. Orloff, supra note 107, at 7.




OPIC will only insure and pay claims on 90% of a loss. OPIC's
statute requires that investors bear the risk of loss of the remaining 10%.
The only exception to this requirement is loans and leases from financial
institutions to unrelated third parties, which may be insured for 100% of
principal and interest.
d. Coverage Multiples and Amount of Insurance
OPIC typically issues insurance commitments equal to 270% of the
initial investment-90% representing the original investment and 180% to
cover future earnings. The maximum amount of coverage available for
any one project is $100 million. Coverage amounts may be limited for
investments in countries where OPIC has a high portfolio concentration
and in highly sensitive projects.
e. Application" 9
The insurance program has a two-step application process. First,
investors are required to register projects with OPIC before the investment
has been made or irrevocably committed. Registration is free of charge
and treated as privileged business information by OPIC. Upon receipt of
the Request for Registration, OPIC will send a confirmation letter and
application forms. A registration is valid for two years. Registration of
a project does not commit OPIC to issue insurance, nor does it indicate
that OPIC's eligibility criteria have been met.
Once the final form of an investment is determined, the investor must
submit an Application for Political Risk Investment Insurance. This
application provides OPIC with detailed information necessary for OPIC
to determine a project's eligibility and underwriting risks.
1992).
119. Inquiries concerning insurance, including requests for the insurance registration
and application forms, should be addressed to:
Applications Officer
Insurance Department
Overseas Private Investment Corporation
1100 New York Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20527
Telephone: (202) 336-8799 or (800) 424-OPIC (6742)
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B. MIGA1 0
1. Background
The World Bank, a multilateral lending agency and MIGA's parent
company, was formed over forty years ago. It consists of the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Development
Association, and the International Finance Corporation, as well as MIGA.
MIGA entered the political risk insurance market in 1988. 121 "One of its
basic objectives is to increase the flow of capital and technology to
developing countries.., by complementing government-sponsored and
private investment guarantee programs." 2
Many national insurance programs, due to their respective national
objectives, contain strict eligibility requirements that exclude many
investors and investments. In addition, national insurance programs have
limited financial resources. MIGA's insurance program overcomes some
of these shortcomings and helps to fill the gaps." Also, because MIGA
is a multilateral agency, it can insure projects for both U.S. and non-U.S.
investors.
2. Risks Covered by MIGA Insurance
Like OPIC, MIGA insurance covers risks of currency inconvertibility,
expropriation, and political violence. MIGA also covers breach of
contract loss as a separate class of risk coverage.1 4 These coverages,
which may be purchased individually or in combination, are discussed
below.
120. Much of the following discussion of MIGA draws on information obtained
directly from MIGA, e.g. the MIGA Investment Guarantee Guide and related information
supplied by MIGA. MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AGENcY, INVESTMENT
GUARANTEE GUIDE (n.d.). See also Rowat, supra note 106, at 128-30, 140-44passim;
Berger, supra note 107, at 13 passim.
121. Rowat, supra note 106, at 105. MIGA was created by the Convention
Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, opened for signature October
11, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1598 (entered into force April 12, 1988), cited in Rowat, supra note
106, at 105 n.9.
122. MULTILATERAL INVSTMENT GUARANTEE AGENCY, supra note 120; Rowat,
supra note 106, at 127 (citing the Preamble to the MIGA Convention).
123. Shihata, Factors , supra note 107, at 690.




Currency inconvertibility insurance covers restrictions of currency
transfers outside of the country that prevent the investor from transferring
profits or liquidation proceeds out of the host country. Excessive delays
in acquiring foreign exchange caused by host government action or
inaction, by adverse changes in exchange control laws or regulations, and
by deterioration in conditions governing the conversion and transfer of
local currency are insured as well. On receipt of the blocked local
currency from the investor, MIGA pays compensation in the currency of
its guarantee. Like OPIC, currency devaluation is not covered.
b. Expropriation
Expropriation coverage protects against acts that deprive the investor
of ownership or control of its investments. "Creeping" expropriation, a
series of acts which, over time, have an expropriatory effect, is also
covered. However, an important difference is that MIGA, unlike OPIC,
excludes from this coverage non-discriminatory measures of general
application which governments normally take for the purpose of regulating
economic activity in their territories. Unfortunately, this exclusion can
allow governments to enact "general" regulations that amount to an
expropriation from the investor's viewpoint, without the regulation being
covered under the expropriation insurance.
For total expropriation of equity investments, MIGA pays the net
book value of the insured investment. For partial expropriation of funds
or assets, MIGA pays the insured portion of the funds or the net book
value of the expropriated assets. For loans and loan guaranties, MIGA
insures the outstanding principal and any accrued and unpaid interest.
c. Political Violence
War and Civil Disturbance coverage insures against losses arising
from politically-motivated acts of war or civil disturbance, including
revolution, insurrection, coup d'etat, sabotage, and terrorism.
Compensation paid is similar to that paid in the event of expropriation.
This coverage also extends to such events that, for a period of one year,
result in an interruption of project operations essential to overall financial
viability. This feature is effective when the investment is considered a
total loss.
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d. Breach of Contract
Breach of Contract coverage compensates investors for any breach or
repudiation of a contract by the host government with the holder of a
guarantee when the holder does not have recourse to another forum, or
where a decision of the other forum is not available within a reasonable
period of time, or where such a decision cannot be enforced.
3. Eligibility for MIGA Insurance 2s
a. Eligible Investors
MIGA requires that the investor seeking insurance be a national of a
member country other than the host country. A corporation is eligible for
coverage if it is either incorporated in and has its principal place of
business in a member country or if it is majority-owned by nationals of
member countries.
b. Eligible Projects
Insurance may be obtained for new investments that are "economically
sound," originate in any member country, and are destined for any
developing member country. New investments also include expansion,
modernization, and refinancing of existing projects, reinvestment of
earnings, and acquisitions that involve the privatization of state enterprises.
Environmental impact must also be considered. Eligible investments must
be new and medium- or long-term in nature. They encompass equity
investments, shareholder loans, and loan guaranties issued by equity
holders, provided that the loans have a minimum average maturity of three
years. Loans to unrelated borrowers can be insured, provided that equity
in the project is being insured concurrently.
Other forms of investment are also eligible, including technical
assistance and management contracts and franchising and licensing
agreements, provided they have terms of at least three years and the
investor's remuneration is tied to the project's operating results.





The investment must be made in the territory of a developing member
country. The Summer 1993 MIGA News newsletter lists both member
countries and countries in the process of fulfilling membership
requirements as of August 30, 1993.126
As in OPIC, the host government must approve the project before
MIGA insurance coverage will be issued. In most cases, MIGA will
request the approval on behalf of the investor. In some countries, MIGA
can accept a copy of the standard investment approval, usually issued by
a specific agency or ministry for all foreign investments, as the approval
for MIGA.
126. Eligible MIGA Member Countries, MIGA NEws (Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency, Washington, D.C.), Summer 1993, at 1, 4. The newsletter states that
"as of August 30, 1993, the MIGA Convention had been signed by 139 countries (20
industrialized countries and 119 category two developing countries), whose subscriptions
total 97 percent of the Agency's authorized capital. Countries listed below in italics have
signed the Convention but have not yet completed all of the membership requirements."
INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: Latin America/Caribbean: Argentina, Bahamas,
Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Paraguay,
Peru, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela.
Europe/Central Asia: Albania, Arnenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Republic of Bosnia
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Republic of Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia,
Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrghyzrtan, Lithuania, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
Malta, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Republic of
Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Middle East/North Africa: Bahrain, Arab Republic of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait,
Libya, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab
Emirates, Republic of Yemen. Asia/Pacific: Bangladesh, China, Fiji, India, Indonesia,
Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Micronesia, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea,
Philippines, Sri Lanka, Vanuatu, Western Samoa. Central & Southern Africa: Angola,
Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Republic of Congo, C6te
d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria,
Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda,
Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
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d. Political Considerations
Political considerations are not as important under MIGA as under
OPIC.1" For example, there is no "human rights" standard that must be
met by the host country, as is required by OPIC.
4. Terms
a. Amount of Insurance
MIGA's guarantee authority is limited to 150% of its unimpaired
subscribed capital and reserves. Underwriting authority for individual
investment projects is limited to 5% of MIGA's total capacity to issue
guarantees. This portion amounts to a maximum coverage of
approximately $50 million per project.
Insurance can be obtained for 90% of the amount invested plus up to
an additional 180% for earnings attributable to the investment; an
additional 90 % can be obtained for interest accruing to increased principal
for loans and loan guarantees.
For technical assistance and similar contracts, MIGA insures up to
90% of the total value of payments under the agreement. Regardless of
the nature of the project, the investor is required to remain at risk for at
least 10% of any loss.
b. Duration
The duration of insurance is from three to fifteen years. The standard
term of coverage is fifteen years, and typically follows the term of the
insured agreement for investments other than equity, such as a ten-year
loan agreement. The term can be extended to twenty years if MIGA finds
that the nature of the project "justifies" an extended term. MIGA may not
terminate its coverage unless the insured investor defaults on its
contractual obligations, but the insured may terminate coverage after three
years or any anniversary thereafter.
c. Cost
MIGA is supposed to be self-sustaining, and its premiums are similar
to OPIC's. Typical base rates for oil and gas coverage for currency
127. See, e.g., Shihata, Factors, supra note 107, at 690.
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inconvertibility, expropriation, breach of contract, and war risks are
0.50%, 1.25%, 1.25%, and 0.60%, respectively (as percentages of the
total insured amount). Stand-by coverage is available for an additional
0.25%, 0.50%, 0.50%, and 0.25%, respectively. 12
d. Co-Insurance
MIGA will cooperate with both public and private political risk
insurers by entering into coinsurance and reinsurance arrangements for
joint coverage of eligible investment projects.
e. Application' 9
A Preliminary Application for Guarantee should be submitted before
the investment is made or irrevocably committed. Applications are treated
confidentially. If MIGA determines that the investment and investor are
eligible, a Notice of Registration and a Definitive Application for
Guarantee are sent to the investor. There is no fee for filing either a
Preliminary Application or a Definitive Application, and there is no
obligation to accept a Contract of Guarantee if one is offered.
C. Private Insurance
1. Background
In the last fifteen years, private insurers have begun to offer political
risk insurance that both complements and competes with government-
subsidized insurance programs. 30 This rapidly growing market' is
concentrated mainly in the U.S. and U.K. and has been estimated to
amount to $200 to $350 million in annual premiums. The most versatile
and experienced private insurer offering political risk insurance is Lloyd's
128. MULTILATERAL NVESTMET GuARANTEE AGENCY, supra note 120, at 9.
129. For further information contact:
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20433
Telephone: (202) 473-0179 or (202) 473-6168.
Fax: (202) 477-9886.
130. Orloff, supra note 107, at 1.
131. Rowat, supra note 106, at 125 n.84.
19941
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of London. " Other insurers include American International Group (AIG),
Citicorp International Trade Indemnity (CITI), Professional Indemnity
Association (PIA, New York), Pan Financial (London and New York),
Chubb Group (New Jersey), and Poole d'Assurance des Risques
Internationaux et Speciaux (P.A.R.I.S.).
13
2. Risks Covered by Private Insurance
Private political risk insurance is generally divided into two
categories: asset coverage and contract coverage. Asset coverage may
include risks such as confiscation, nationalization, expropriation (including
creeping expropriation), and repossession of equipment. Contract
coverage may include loss from contract repudiation, currency
inconvertibility, and contract cancellation due to political violence.
13'
Thus, the risks covered are similar to the risks covered by government-
sponsored insurance.
Of the types of risk insured against by private insurers, confiscation,
nationalization, and expropriation insurance are of the most interest to
energy investors. As with government-sponsored insurance, compensation
is usually based upon book value. Confiscation/nationalization/
expropriation insurance policies can usually be expanded to cover license
cancellations, trade embargoes, strikes, riots, loss of income following
expropriation, and other types of political risk. 13 In addition, each insurer
will have additional limitations and qualifications as to the amounts and
types of insurance it can offer.
3. Terms
The terms offered by the private insurers are between one and three
years, which are significantly shorter than those offered by OPIC and
MIGA. Underwriting limits range from $5 million to $300 million per
risk, depending on the insurer and the country in which the investment is
located.1 36 These limits are in the same range as those of OPIC ($100
million) and MIGA ($50 million per project). 37
132. Orloff, supra note 107, at 3.
133. Rowat, supra note 106, at 125 n.84.
134. Orloff, supra note 107, at 4.
135. Id. at 5.
136. Id. at 3; see also Rowat, supra note 106, at 126.
137. Rowat, supra note 106, at 126.
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Private market fees are substantially higher than those of government
insurance programs and "in some cases can be as much as seven percent
for coverage in high risk countries." 3 ' Lloyd's current rate for insuring
investments in the former Soviet republics is between two and three
percent of the value of the investment. 1 ' Premiums are based on a
number of factors, including the size of the investment, nationality of the
investor, risks associated with the host country, risks covered by the
insurance, and the structure of the investment."4 Despite relatively higher
rates, however, private insurance remains attractive to certain investors,
such as those who fall outside the eligibility requirements of programs
such as OPIC and MIGA.
141
Whether OPIC, MIGA, or private insuraice is best suited for any
particular investment can only be determined on a case-by-case basis. On
the one hand, private insurance is more flexible, can be customized to
meet the needs of a particular investment, can be kept in strict confidence,
and can be negotiated in days rather than months. Private insurance is
also not constrained by political considerations to the same degree as is
government-subsidized insurance. On the other hand, because OPIC and
MIGA policies are government subsidized, they are generally less
expensive; they can also be issued for terms of up to twenty years.
Finally, OPIC and MIGA also have better facilities for covering currency
138. Id.
139. Orloff, supra note 107, at 6.
140. Id. at 6-7.
141. Sometimes the host country itself may be involved in offering insurance to
investors. For example, in February of 1993 the Russian government set up the State
Investment Corporation to sell political-risk insurance for foreign investors investing in
Russia. Some Cover, ECONOMmIST, Feb. 27, 1993, at 84. Additionally, the Russian
Agency for International Cooperation and Development, a Russian government agency,
has put together a billion-dollar program to provide political risk insurance for investors
in Russia, and is also establishing new investment banks in cooperations with major
international financial institutions. Commnercial Overview of Russia, BUS. INfo. SERVICE
FOR THE NEWLY bDEPENDANT STATES, (U.S. Dep't of Commerce, New York, N.Y.),
July 10, 1993, at 1, 3.
The Business Information Service for the Newly Independent States ("BISNIS")
provides documents via the "Flashfax BISNIS Bank," a 24-hour automated fax delivery
system administered by the International Trade Administration of the U.S. Department of
Commerce, containing free information on current trade and investment opportunities,
trade statistics, and other information concerning the newly independent states of the
former Soviet Union. BISNIS can be reached by dialing (202) 482-3145 from a touch-
tone phone. The address is: United States Department of Commerce, International Trade
Administration, Business Information Service for the Newly Independent States, Room H-
7413, Washington, D.C. 20230. Id.
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inconvertibility risks than do private insurers.14 2 As between OPIC and
MIGA, a decision as to which policy is best will often be based upon price
and eligibility requirements.
V. CONCLUSION
Western investors seek to benefit themselves and the populace of
developing countries by investing needed capital to finance production and
economic growth. But unless political risks are minimized, investors will
not be willing to invest their precious time and capital. Fortunately, as the
world begins to gain a greater appreciation for the importance of property
rights, methods are becoming available to lower political risks to allow
investment to proceed.
Concessions, directly negotiated between the investor and the host
state, containing stabilization and international arbitration clauses, are one
method of reducing political risks; purchasing government-sponsored or
even private insurance is still another. The protections won by BITs also
serve to reduce the political risks inherent in foreign in'jestment. BITs
create a regime anchored in international law which is favorable, not
hostile, to investment-a regime which attempts to prevent expropriation,
direct or indirect, and to provide for full compensation when expropriation
does occur.
Hopefully, for the sake of both investors and the developing
countries, the trend towards greater protection of the property rights of
investors will continue in this direction.
142. Orloff, supra note 107, at 7.
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